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Abstract 
When the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS), the flagship institution of 
Costa Rica’s ‘exceptional’ -solidary and universal- social policy regime, entered 
in financial crisis in 2011, the already difficult social integration of Nicaraguan 
immigrants in Costa Rica became even more critical. Faced with a general 
deterioration of social services, a perception that immigrants are threatening 
the availability of jobs and social services for the national population, and 
voices that advocate the creation of limits to social rights and access to social 
benefits, this essay analyzes the political reaction of the State, specifically 
whether it chooses to limit immigrants’ access to healthcare. In a discussion on 
state sovereignty, universalism and social rights, this article argues that 
immigration control responsibilities are transferred to social policy institutions, 
“shifting in” migration control and that the principle of universalism of Costa 
Rica’s social policy regime does not necessarily apply to parts of the immigrant 
population, both irregular and regular. 
Keywords 
Migration, social policy, migration control, universalismo, citizenship. 
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“Shifting in” migration control1 
Universalism and immigration in Costa Rica 
1 Introduction 
The fundamental principles of universalism and solidarity that underlie Costa 
Rica’s ‘exceptional’ social policy regime are under pressure. In 2011, its flagship 
institution, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS) entered into a financial 
crisis (Carrillo et al., 2011), and with its financial sustainability at risk, voices of 
‘welfare chauvinism’ (Banting, 2000; Faist, 1994), understood as the “fear 
among groups in the native population […] that certain new immigrant groups 
take away jobs, housing and social services” (Faist, 1994: 440) and the rejection 
of open immigration policies and easy access to social benefits by foreigners 
(Andersen and Bjørklund, 1990; Andersen, 1992; Kitschelt, 1995), seem to 
echo louder than ever before. In this context, the already controversial social 
integration of Nicaraguan immigrants in Costa Rica (Bonilla-Carrión, 2008; 
Dobles et al., 2013; Sandoval, in press), has become even more critical. 
Costa Rica is, in relative terms, the largest recipient of migrants in Latin 
America (UN, 2009), with a migrant ‘stock’ of about 9 percent of the total 
population in 2011 (INEC, 2011). And although immigration growth has 
slowed down from 7.5% in the 1984-2000 period to 2.4% between 2000-2011 
(INEC, 2011), Costa Rica’s immigrant population keeps growing. Of particular 
importance is Nicaraguan immigration (Sandoval, 2008, Morales and Castro, 
2006), four out of every five immigrants being Nicaraguan. These migrants go 
from the second poorest country in the Western Hemisphere (Martinez and 
Voorend, 2011), with exceptionally low GDP per capita (U.S. $ 956 in 2010) 
(ECLAC, 2011), and a virtually absent state in terms of social protection 
(Martinez and Voorend, 2011), to the richest country in Central America with 
relatively high per capita GDP (U.S. $ 5,340) and a strong state-led social 
protection system (Martínez Franzoni, 2008). 
This protection system, however, is under unprecedented strain (Martínez 
Franzoni and Sánchez Ancochea, 2013), and many blame Nicaraguan 
immigrants for the difficulties it faces. Fuelled by negative media coverage 
(Sandoval, 2008, Gonzalez and Horbaty, 2005), in the social imaginary of at 
least three quarters of the Costa Rican population there is a persistent belief 
that they form a risk to the country’s social security (Gonzalez and Varela, in 
Bonilla-Carrion, 2008). Similarly, Nicaraguan immigrants are believed more 
likely to make use of public social services, because of their “lower social levels 
and their ‘irregularity’” (Bonilla-Carrion, 2008: 146. Own translation), and 
assumed to be overrepresented as users of social services, especially healthcare. 
                                                 
1 A previous, different version of this paper in Spanish was accepted for publication 
by CLACSO. I am grateful for comments from Eduardo Domenech, María Mercedes 
Eguiguren, Francisco Robles Rivera and the participants of CLACSO’s Primera Escuela 
Internacional de Posgrado Red de Posgrado y Núcleos de Estudio en Migraciones. I am 
particularly indebted to Karla Venegas, who provided assistance in the interviews. 
Errors are, of course, my responsibility. 
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Faced with economic and social security crises, a common public policy 
reaction is to construct and mobilize “boundaries around issues of distribution 
of welfare state resources” (Faist, 1994: 440). Indeed, creating access to or 
exclusion from certain welfare benefits can become powerful tools to 
encourage certain types of migration and discourage others (Geddes, 2003; 
Morrissens, 2008). Especially where border control capacity is limited, internal 
migration control methods are put in place (Hollifield, 2000), thereby shifting 
responsibilities to other organisms (Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000; Morris, 2002), 
mainly through the social protection regime and social rights (Geddes, 2003). 
With voices of welfare chauvinism fuelling a harsh debate on access to 
welfare benefits of Nicaraguan immigrants, at a time Costa Rica’s universal 
welfare state is under unprecedented pressure, does the country turn to limit 
newcomers’ access to welfare state resources? This article aims to answer this 
question, focusing specifically on immigrants’ access to Costa Rica’s universal 
healthcare system. In particular, it analyses a recent reform to migration 
legislature in 2009, and several more recent internal communications of the 
CCSS, complemented with semi-structured interviews with CCSS and 
migration officials.2  
In doing so, I hope to contribute to two important debates on the 
crossroads of the migration-social policy nexus. The first is the discussion on 
universalism and migrants’ access to healthcare services. In particular, I 
question the universalism Costa Rica’s social policy is famed for, as it does not 
apply to parts of the immigrant population, irrespective of their migratory 
status. The second is the state sovereignty debate, and the way migration is 
seen as a case of nation-states losing control (Sassen, 1996). Specifically, I 
question globalist perspectives that attribute the demise of national sovereignty 
to the emergence of international human rights regimes and that claim national 
citizenship has lost its central importance in the extension of social rights 
(Soysal, 1994; Jacobson, 1996; Sassen, 1996; Sharma, 2006; Robinson, 2009). In 
contrast, in line with authors such as Joppke (1999; 2007; 2010), Guiraudon 
and Lahav (2000) and López (2012), based on the Costa Rican case, I show 
State policy to be a critical factor in immigrants’ social integration, as the State 
“shifts in” migration control through its social policy regime. 
In the section that follows, I briefly discuss the two mentioned debates on 
migration in relation to state-sovereignty and universalism. Next, section three 
introduces Costa Rica as ‘exceptional’ in the Central American region with 
regards to both social policy and migration patterns. Section four then presents 
the analysis of Costa Rica’s migration policy, focusing on measures of internal 
                                                 
2 At the moment of writing, I am conducting a series of interviews with CCSS, 
DGME, Ministry of Education and Health officials both of high ranks and counter 
clerks, as well as academics and representatives of civil society. The information of 
this round of interviews, which has not yet finished, is still being processed. 
Therefore, this document is not enriched by the perceptions of the interviewees in the 
extent I would like it to be. I hope to correct this flaw in the near future, as well as 
write an article specifically on the social construction of the immigrant as a threat to 
social security in Costa Rica. 
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migration control through the CCSS, and immigrants’ access to healthcare. The 
last section offers some final reflections. 
2   Migration, state sovereignty and universalism 
2.1 Migration and citizenship 
By definition, the modern state forms part of the creation of international 
migration (Joppke, 1999). That is, if there were no States, there would be no 
such a thing as international migration. States shape migration in different 
ways, given that international migration “is enabled by and feeds upon the 
communicative, expansive grid of the modern state system” (Joppke, 1999: 1). 
Simultaneously, throughout history, governments have had an active role in the 
creation of transborder movements, for example through the expulsion of 
religious, ethnic or political populations, as colonial influences or as States 
recruiting labor abroad for domestic economies (Joppke, 1999; Bommes and 
Geddes, 2000, Castles and Miller, 2009). 
At the same time, migration challenges the very notion of the State (Faist, 
1994, 1995, Sassen, 1996, 1998; Bommes and Geddes, 2000, Guiraudon and 
Lahav, 2000; Sharma, 2006). If the State is understood as a series of rights and 
obligations granted equally to all members of the community, but at the same 
time as mechanisms of closure, separating members from non-members 
(Brubaker, 1992), migration defies these mechanisms because of its 
transnational nature (Sharma, 2006; Bommes and Geddes, 2000) and 
destabilizes the order of the nation-state (Sandoval, 2008). 
Authors such as Sassen (1996) and Favell (2006), in their analysis of post-
national arguments, argue that economic globalization leads to increased 
capital, financial and labour mobility, and thereby decreases the power and 
importance of the nation state. This results in an inherent tension between the 
nation-state, a national concept by definition, and the “denationalizing” logic 
of globalization (Sassen, 1996). Immigration is a crucial factor in this tension 
Sassen (1998). 
In this context, the discussion on citizenship and social rights becomes 
central. Citizenship, understood as individual rights, participation and 
membership in different institutional spaces (Bauböck, 2007; López, 2012), is 
key to understanding the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in welfare states. 
Citizenship lies at the basis of “the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, 
which define both those who are full members of existing networks of 
reciprocity and deserve support, and those who are ‘strangers’ or ‘others’ to 
whom little is owed” (Banting, 2000: 13). Of important note is that these 
boundaries, and thereby membership, are not written in stone, but are “socially 
constructed with respect to different groups of people and in different 
institutional contexts” (López, 2012: 6). 
Through citizenship, national protection systems become political filters 
that intervene in immigrants’ efforts to realize their potential for social 
participation (Bommes and Geddes, 2000). Once immigrants arrive in a new 
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country, will they be included in national welfare arrangements, or, in other 
words, will they have access to social, economic, civil and political rights? 
Marshall’s (1950) famous work on social citizenship, as well as subsequent 
critics and elaborations, tried to answer this question. Marshall explored how 
social citizenship through the functioning of social welfare institutions, 
progressively extended to various social groups (López, 2012). The famous 
‘Marshallian triptych’ is an evolutionary account of social citizenship, where 
people are granted first civil rights (e.g. protection from discrimination, 
freedom of thought, expression and religion), then political rights (e.g. the right 
to vote), and finally social rights (e.g. eligibility for universal healthcare and 
education). 
There is, however, debate as to how accurate Marshall’s model is to 
explain the extension of rights to immigrant groups (Bauböck, 1995, Joppke 
1999; Guiraudon, 2000, Bosniak 2000; Kivisto and Faist, 2007; Lopez 2012). 
The social groups Marshall analyzed were all nationals, but the process of 
social inclusion is not as automatic for immigrants. Bauböck (1995) and 
Guiraudon (2000), for example, argue that the extension of civil, political and 
social rights to newcomers took place in an order that revokes Marshall’s: 
social benefits were secured very early on while political rights are still 
contested. In contrast, Schierup et al. (2006: 63) reason that at the 
supranational level Marshall’s triptych is put “back on its feet” through “a 
marketbound civic citizenship” (see also Ryner, 2000), but without this 
necessarily guaranteeing the evolutionary follow-up of social citizenship. 
In any case, it is clear that migration transforms the traditional notion of 
citizenship (Bauböck, 2007), and has diversified categories of membership in 
societies, “defying the citizen–alien dualism of either full or no membership at 
all” (Joppke, 1999: 6). For example, immigrants with regular migratory status, 
but who do not enjoy full social rights and only limited access to social policy, 
have been called ‘denizens’ (Hammar, 1990), a sort of incomplete citizenship 
that evidences processes of civil stratification (Morris, 2002). 
At the bottom of this stratification are so-called ‘aliens’, people who live 
and work in the country often without official documentation, and do not 
enjoy the basic rights associated with citizenship (Bosniak, 2000). Since many 
of these people enter the country without official permission, their presence in 
the host societies usually generates stern political controversy (Lopez, 2012). 
Thereby, citizenship not only serves as an imposition of national borders, but 
also as a “as a legal divide inside the political community, separating full 
members from those people who are located within the national territory but 
who are not formally recognized as full members” (Bosniak, 2000: 963).  
2.2 On state sovereignty: inclusion and exclusion 
Whether welfare states will grant migrant populations social rights or not, the 
literature seems to be divided and authors reach one of two opposing 
conclusions (Baldwin-Edwards, 2002). To a large extent, these conclusions are 
founded in another on-going debate, on the extent to which “developments 
subsumed under the term “globalization” have eroded national sovereignty 
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[…] and international norms have constrained national policy making” 
(Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000: 163). On the one extreme, there are authors like 
Freeman (1986) who argue that (welfare) states are inevitably exclusive to 
secure and defend the social, political and economic rights of the privileged 
citizen, as well as access to (welfare) benefits. Implicit in this view is that States 
have the power and capacity to control unwanted migration as well as to set 
and apply the rules of membership to the national polity.  
The other extreme is represented by globalist authors (Soysal, 1994; 
Jacobsen, 1996, Sassen, 1996, 1998; Sharma, 2006), who see migration as a 
“case of nation-states losing control” (Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000).  Sharma 
(2006), using an anthropological lens, argues that we are living in a world 
where citizenship is exercised and administered transnationally. On a similar 
note, Soysal (1994) and Jacobson (1996) contribute this evolution to “the 
emergence of an international human rights regime that prevents nation-states 
from deciding who can enter and leave their territory” (Guiraudon and Lahav, 
2000: 164). States are thus required to grant broad social rights to immigrants 
living in the country, and these rights are synonymous with citizenship 
(Baldwin-Edwards, 2002). Human rights are inalienable natural and legal rights, 
independent of nationality, in contrast to the national political, social and civil 
rights that are based on the distinction between domestic and foreign (Sassen 
1996, 1998). Globalist perspectives then argue that human rights and 
immigration challenge state sovereignty, thereby inducing a devaluation of the 
importance of citizenship (Sassen, 1996: 95). Human rights agendas would 
then prevail over national attempts of exclusion, and eventually involve the 
granting of social rights to immigrants, simply because States cannot afford not 
to. 
Finally, there are authors that take a middle position between “nation-state 
defenders and nation-state bashers” (Joppke, 1999: 4). Without denying the 
importance of transnational forces and economic globalization on public 
policymaking, and despite the prominence of transnational modes of 
citizenship in the literature, these authors question the inevitable loss of state 
sovereignty versus transnational law (Faist, 1994; Joppke, 1999; Guiraudon and 
Lahav, 2000; Bommes and Geddes, 2000; Banting, 2000; Hollifield, 2000; 
Sainsbury, 2006). In contrast, they argue, neither the State nor national 
citizenship have lost the centrality they had regarding the extension of rights 
(Joppke, 1999; 2007; 2010; Lopez, 2012). The actual level of immigrants’ social 
inclusion then depends greatly on the country specific context, and to be more 
precise, on the combination of national immigration and social policies.  
Within this line of argument, and especially significant for the argument I 
would like to make, Guiraudon and Lahav (2000) convincingly demonstrate 
that the importance of international normative constraints on migration 
control should not be overestimated. They argue that globalist perspectives 
overlook inventive state responses, thereby circumventing international 
constraints. States have adapted at least in three ways, shifting the level at 
which policy is elaborated and implemented “up, down, and out” (177). 
Thereby, it ensures its sovereignty in the field of migration control, and thus in 
granting rights related to citizenship. Specifically, they evidence trends towards 
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more coordinated migration control at the international level to counter 
transnational law (shifting up), trends of decentralizing immigration policy to 
local levels, which more easily escape transnational law (shifting down) and trends 
towards a sort of outsourcing of migration control functions to the private 
sector, by fining behavior that is not in accordance with immigration policy 
(shifting out) (Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000).  
This shifting behavior also happens when the State applies internal 
migration control measures, which transfer “responsibility to agencies […] 
whose primary concern is not immigration enforcement, for example, 
hospitals” (Morris, 2002: 23). When national welfare arrangements are 
employed to alter migration flows, I argue that the State is shifting in migration 
control. Following Guiraudon and Lahav (2000: 164) this “multifaceted 
devolution of migration policy […] shows the adaptiveness of agencies within 
the central state apparatus in charge of migration control”. 
As I will argue below, the Costa Rican case is good example of this 
‘shifting in’ behavior, where maybe in discourse human rights are adhered to 
but in practice the State finds internal ways to limit newcomers’ social rights 
and access to social policy as part of restrictive immigration policy measures. 
2.3 Universalism 
Social policy, understood as public interventions that have the objective to 
prevent people suffering income and life opportunities losses, while actively 
promoting decent living and work conditions for all, play a central role in the 
economic and social incorporation of immigrants. Social policies are 
fundamentally political exercises that define the institutional base of citizenship 
rights, and articulate the principle mechanisms of integration and segregation 
within societies (Fischer, 2009; Mkandawire, 2005). 
These mechanisms depend to a large extent on the dominant paradigms 
behind and choice of social policy provisioning. While it is a highly contested 
issue (Fischer, 2009; Danson et al., 2012), several authors demonstrate the 
advantages of universalism on other social policy approaches, such as (means-
tested) targeting. Fischer (2009: 6) argues that the latter “usually entrenches 
segmentation in provisioning systems, which in turn reinforces social and 
economic stratification by removing middle classes and their political voice 
from the services that are supplied to and accessed by the poor”. 
The advantage of universal social policies, understood as those that reach 
the entire population with similar generous transfers and services of quality 
(Martínez Franzoni and Ancochea Sánchez, 2013), is that the middle class 
would be more willing to support social programs and its funding, regardless 
of whether they are designed for specific groups or to the general population. 
In addition, this alliance between classes, not only favors coverage but also the 
quality of the services provided. Thus, universal social policies have more 
impact on poverty, vulnerability and inequality (Fischer, 2009; Mkandawire, 
2005). Finally, people with very different income levels and personal 
characteristics end up sharing a similar treatment based on their status as 
citizens, which forms the source of eligibility. 
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However, universal social policy is not a sufficient condition to ensure 
immigrants’ access to such policies. If the right to access social policy is very 
narrowly defined as the right of citizenship (Lister, 1990), this would include 
citizens only and exclude immigrant minorities, even if these have their 
residence documentation in order.  
In what follows, I briefly discuss the formation of Costa Rica’s social 
policy regime, and how immigration has come to be perceived as a threat to 
the sustainability of this regime, causing political reactions that do not favor 
the social incorporation of the immigrant population. Then I aim to show the 
limits of Costa Rica’s universalism, and how social policy becomes central in 
the country’s immigration control. 
3  From crisis to crisis: migration and social policy in 
Costa Rica 
3.1 Costa Rica: from exceptional to uncertain 
In the South, Costa Rica is often characterized as ‘exceptional’, given its unique 
historical path, and its ability to create a strong social policy regime, 
understood as policies and programs that impact social welfare, social 
institutions and social relations, including education, health, housing, transfers 
and pensions. This regime is based on universalism and solidarity, and in 
combination with a relatively strong formal labor market that provides jobs 
with decent pay (Haggard and Kaufman, 2008; Martínez Franzoni and 
Sánchez-Ancochea, 2013), the country has been able to secure formal 
employment and social protection for a good part of its citizens. In other 
words, where very few countries in the developing world in general, and in 
Latin America in particular achieved it, the country was able to ensure the 
“elusive double incorporation” (Martínez Franzoni and Ancochea Sánchez, 
2013), that is, simultaneous economic and social incorporation. 
Costa Rica established very early on universal free primary education, high 
rates of social security coverage, including vulnerable and non-contributory 
groups (Filgueira, 1998, 2004, Mesa-Lago, 1994), and is considered a health 
“success story” (Noy, 2012). This becomes evident in some key indicators such 
as the low infant mortality rate of 8.8 per 1000 births in 2009 (Saenz et al. 
2011: S158), and life expectancy at birth, which in 2010 reached 79.4 years, the 
highest of all the Americas (ECLAC, 2011), and very similar to Northern 
European countries like Norway (81.1 years), Netherlands (80.7 years) and 
Germany (80.4 years) (HDR 2011). 
These positive results are the outcome of a very particular historical 
development (Martínez Franzoni and Sanchez-Ancochea, 2012b). There is 
debate about the factors that explain the formation of the social protection 
architecture, with the creation of the CCSS in 1941, and periods of increases in 
social investment in the 40s, 50s and 70s, and how Costa Rica was able to 
create universalism in its social policy. However, an in-depth discussion of this 
debate is beyond the scope of this article (for a discussion, see Sandbrook et 
al., 2007; Filgueira, 2007, Huber and Stephens 2012 or Martínez Franzoni and 
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Sanchez-Ancochea, 2013). Briefly, Martínez Franzoni and Sanchez-Ancochea 
Franzoni (2013), questioning common explanations that emphasize the 
centrality of leftist parties in a stable democracy, or causal relationships 
between the abolition of the army in 1948 and the creation of social protection 
architecture in the 40s, show that a crucial fact was that social insurance was 
built ‘from below”, actually at first excluding the middle class. This prevented 
the latter from grabbing welfare benefits, and allowed for the creation of a 
unified system that ensures healthcare benefits for all. 
While social investment kept growing steadily, especially the 1970s saw a 
considerable expansion in the country’s social welfare arrangements, including 
non-contributory benefits very different from other countries in Latin 
America. The state not only played a central role as a provider of welfare, but 
also as an employer (Vega, 2000). At the peak of state influence in the late 
1970s, one in every five Costa Ricans was employed in the public sector (Vega, 
2000), domestic state firms and bureaucracy. 
By 1970, Costa Rica boasted a practically universal primary education 
system, and when the decade came to a close, a “virtually universal health 
insurance and medical services available to all, either through contributory or 
non-contributory means” (Martínez Franzoni and Ancochea, 2012a: 90). 
However, the 80s marked a period of momentous transformation, following 
the debt crisis early in the decade and subsequent structural reforms promoted 
by the Washington Consensus. These reforms translated into trade 
liberalization, financial deregulation and a reduced State presence during the 
80s and 90s (Robinson, 2003), and marked the transition to a new economic 
model with a more diversified (Segovia, 2004), but also more unevenly 
distributed economic structure, and unequal levels of access to stable and well-
paid jobs (Martínez Franzoni and Sanchez-Ancochea, 2013). 
While it is noteworthy that the architecture of the social policy regime has 
been remarkably resilient to changes in the three decades after the debt crisis, it 
is also true that there are “growing tensions due to the need to do more with 
less per capita resources” (Martínez Franzoni and Sanchez-Ancochea, 2012a: 
90). Although most social programs and institutions still exist, this has meant a 
loss of quality in social services such as health care and education, and an 
increase in the supply of private services. In all, the State has been left in a 
weaker position to provide social protection (Martínez Franzoni, 2008). 
A case in point is the health sector. Neoliberal reforms have translated 
into cuts in basic supplies, increases in delivery time, longer waiting lists and 
dissatisfaction on the part of the national population (Miranda, 1994, in 
Martinez Franzoni and Sanchez-Ancochea, 2012). Indicative of these changes 
has been the dramatic increase in the private provision of health services. 
Between 1993 and 1998, own pocket health spending rose five times (Smith 
and Davis, 2001) and between 2000 and 2009, the share of private health 
expenditure increased from 23% to 33% (Martínez Franzoni and Sanchez-
Ancochea, 2013) driven mainly middle and upper middle income groups. 
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3.2 Migration and the CCSS crisis 
The eighties also marked structural change in migration flows. One of the 
salient features of the structural reforms and social transformations Central 
America underwent as of the 80s, was the increase in international labour 
migration (Voorend and Robles, 2011; Sandoval, 2007; Segovia, 2004, 
Robinson, 2003, Rose, 2008). As with social policy, Costa Rica marks a trend 
contrary to the rest of the region. Where all the other Central American 
countries have high net emigration rates, Costa Rica has been for several 
decades a net receiver of immigrants, without this meaning that Costa Ricans 
do not emigrate (Caamaño, 2008).  
Especially as of the 90s, the country received an important number of 
Nicaraguan labour immigrants, and in the early 2000s, Costa Rica was the most 
important destination country for Nicaraguan migrants, followed by the U.S. 
(Baumeister, Fernández  y  Acuña,  2008; Acuña et al., 2013). Between 1984 
and 2000, the Nicaraguan population in Costa Rica increased from 45,918 to 
226,374, which represents an increase from 1.9 to 5.9 percent of the total 
population (Castro, 2008). In 2011, the total immigrant population represented 
9% of the total population, of which 80% came from Nicaragua (INEC, 2011). 
These data, however, do not include the unknown number of irregular and 
temporary immigrants, of which a large share finds work in the informal labour 
market (Voorend y Robles Rivera, 2011). These mainly low-skilled Nicaraguan 
immigrants find jobs in agriculture (men and women), construction (men) and 
domestic service (women) (Morales and Castro, 2006; Sandoval, 2008). In fact, 
Nicaraguan immigration has become a cornerstone for the functioning of these 
economic sectors (Voorend and Robles, 2011). 
Nicaraguan immigrant population growth in Costa Rica, combined with 
increasing financial difficulties of the social policy regime has led to a situation 
of tension between the two. Partly as a result of the international financial 
crisis of 2008, which resulted in a slowdown of the Costa Rican economy and 
increases in unemployment rates, in 2011 the flagship institution of health and 
social security, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS), entered into a 
financial crisis that has put into question the institution’s sustainability (Carrillo 
et al., 2011). The CCSS was established in 1941 as a social security agency and 
the main provider of health services in Costa Rica. Originally it provided health 
services to formal workers only, but soon after expanded to include their 
families in 1961. Since then it has extended to cover the entire population, 
including non-contributive groups, and currently effectively covers over 85% 
of Costa Ricans (Noy, 2012; Martinez, 2008). 
In 2009, the first signs of financial problems within the CCSS showed, 
induced by the international financial crisis. In real terms, Costa Rica’s GDP 
fell by 1.3%, representing a fiscal deficit of -4% and -5% in 2009 and 2010, 
respectively (PAHO, 2011). The CCSS is allocated 11% of the GDP (7% for 
healthcare and 4% for pensions), so the financial crisis directly impacted the 
CCSS’s income. That said, the PAHO report (2011) on the causes of the crisis, 
emphasized very important other factors: huge cost and salary increases, and 
mismanagement. Combined with declining revenues and record growth of 
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wage employment as well as a wage increase, the CCSS’s financial situation 
deteriorated rapidly between 2009 and 2011, when the problem came to light. 
PAHO (2011) projects that without counter measures the financial deficit 
could exceed U.S. $ 600 million in 2015, about 11% of total planned 
expenditure. 
3.3 Welfare magnet in the south: the perceived threat of 
immigration 
These factors have contributed to a general perception under the Costa Rican 
population that Nicaraguan immigrants form a threat to the availability of jobs 
(Voorend and Robles Rivera, 2011), to security (Sandoval, 2008; Dobles et al, 
2013) and to the social policy regime (Bonilla-Carrión, 2008). With less 
availability of jobs, especially in rural areas, lower real wages (Segovia, 2004) 
and less state intervention, the social and economic integration of low-skilled 
Nicaraguans becomes ever more contentious and difficult. 
A general practitioner from the CCSS voices this general concern: 
“Unfortunately, I mean, I feel that a large part of the problem of the crisis of 
the CCSS comes from the disorder in the way services have been provided to 
immigrants because with this idea that we can’t tell them ‘no’ in certain 
situations, for many people, as the saying goes, we give them a finger and they 
take the whole hand” (Interview. Marta Jara, General practitioner, CCSS). 
For Feldman-Bianco et al. (2011), the social construction of the immigrant 
subject as a threat is key to understanding social processes and public policies. 
They claim (2011:17. Own translation) that it is necessary “to recognize that 
migrants are social actors operating in specific historical circumstances and 
situations”. Rooted in the structural changes of the 80s and 90s, and in an 
unfavorable economic context, the immigrant is perceived as a threat and 
immigration in general, but especially from Nicaragua, as a “necessary evil” 
(Dobles et al., 2013).  
Although Nicaraguan immigrant labour is indispensable for productive 
and reproductive activities in key sectors of the Costa Rican economy, there is 
a perception that most immigrants enter the country in irregular conditions 
(Sandoval, 2008), and therefore lacking of social rights. Following Domenech 
(2011:33), who argues that immigration “is constructed as a problem primarily 
from the illegality that it is ascribed, it is this illegality that structures the vision of 
the State” (2011:33. Italics in the original), it should not come as a surprise that 
this perception exists within the CCSS. Even when immigrants have a regular 
migratory status, it does not mean this will translate into access to social rights, 
because many public employees consider almost all Nicaraguan immigrants as 
‘illegal’ and therefore undeserving (López, 2012). 
Indeed, López (2012: 188) shows that even with a ‘legal’ migratory status 
and right to services, “policy makers and service providers tend to ignore the 
differences between these migrant workers and others migratory groups 
without such rights, such as ‘illegal migrants’. And thus, without a clear 
understanding of the entitlements that correspond to the status of a legal 
temporary migrant, policy makers tend to deny them certain benefits”. CCSS 
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employees have been known to deny immigrants access on the basis of the 
‘illegality’ parameter, even when these immigrants are national residents or 
were formally recruited through bilateral agreements. 
Despite the fact that the services the CCSS should be provided to anybody 
with regular migratory status, to CCSS employees the perception of immigrant 
‘illegality’, regardless of their possession of legal documentation or not, in some 
cases forms the basis for high levels of distrust, and a perception of illegitimate 
demand for the services the institution provides (López, 2012). Indeed, as 
argued by Dobles et al. (2013), the public service attention immigrants receive 
depends much on “who is sitting at the counter”. 
However, in interviews with CCSS and Migration - Dirección General de 
Migración y Extranjería (DGME) - officials, it became clear that they too 
perceived Costa Rica’s social policy regime in general, and the services of the 
CCSS in particular, to be a welfare magnet for Nicaraguan immigrants. The 
main factors that make Costa Rica’s welfare arrangements attractive, according 
to interviewees, are the fact that high quality health services are delivered free 
of charge and the possibility of acquiring the Costa Rican nationality when 
having a child in Costa Rican territory, through the ius soli principle. 
Concerning the first, among the general practitioners and nurses 
interviewed, it is “obvious for them, having to pay part of the medical consult, 
and having to pay for medicines, coming here where practically everything is 
for free, well, that is a super powerful magnet, right?” (Interview. Marta Jara, 
CCSS). Indeed, “they consider that healthcare is better here, which is a huge 
benefit for them, and, well, they don’t have to pay, well, they might pay an 
insurance, o a small fee, but they don’t pay for the injection, they don’t pay for 
the syringe, they don’t pay…right, a private service” (Interview. Giselle 
Román, Nurse, CCSS). 
This perception persists even among high ranking CCSS officials. The 
Director of Inspection, for example, voiced concern over people “coming to a 
country but not having the conscience that they come and have to contribute 
and comply with the laws of the country, so that is where it gets complicated, 
they don’t see it as something positive – ‘I have to contribute, they make me 
but I don’t want’ - because they don’t have a broad perception of what a social 
security system is. But they fully understand that it is beneficial and they come 
to the country for that, for healthcare many of them” (Interview. Director of 
Inspection, CCSS). 
With regard to the second, almost all interviewees mentioned anecdotal 
evidence of Nicaraguan women crossing the border pregnant, or becoming 
pregnant in Costa Rica, to not only access medical services offered by the 
CCSS, but also Costa Rican nationality through their Costa Rican born child. 
“They do not tell us this, but with so much repetition one concludes that 
among other benefits they acquire residence by the child born right here. Then, 
if my son is Tico, I have rights, that is, I am not the direct beneficiary but my 
son being a Costa Rican, I get many benefits, and they cannot tell me ‘you 
leave and leave the child here, because we would be violating the rights of 
child” (Interview. Giselle Román, CCSS). 
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Not only is this seen as welfare strategy of pregnant women crossing the 
border where thanks to the child “I get the residence permit, they educate me 
and more […] and I stay in Costa Rica for a better future, a better life style that 
unfortunately I will never have in Nicaragua” (Interview. Adrián Jiménez, 
Planning Direction Deputy, DGME), but there are “even many Nicaraguans 
that get Costa Rican women pregnant to have a child and by family tie, they 
stay here. Come on, let’s not be naïve, let’s not be so innocent to say that 
migration is pure […] There is also an economic reason, or social, or even 
family decisions to do these kind of things. If you tell me, show me the study, 
no, I don’t need studies, I see it, that simple, I see it just by working in 
Migration, I see it in my neighborhood, in firms, in the local supermarket, you 
see it when you go to the stadium, you see it everywhere. Well, it’s true!” 
(Interview. Adrián Jiménez, DGME).  
This ‘demonization’ of the immigrant subject is much enforced by 
national media (Sandoval, 2008, Dobles et al., 2013), and takes place despite 
more objective analyses. For example, in 2003, Castillo (2003) - of the 
Economic Department of the CCSS- provided a very simple incidence analysis. 
In 2002, the immigrant population accounted for between 4% and 6.3% of 
total CCSS services, less than proportional to the total foreign population 
registered in Household Surveys of 2002 (6.91%). As beneficiaries covered by 
the State, which means that beneficiaries without insurance have no sufficient 
income to pay the hospital bills, immigrants are, not surprisingly, 
overrepresented. Based on data from the CCSS, they represent slightly under 
20% of the total number of beneficiaries covered by the State.  
In 2009, a CCSS study showed that the Nicaraguan population 
contributed more to social security than it used in social services (Bravo, 2009), 
a fact confirmed in several studies of the Directorate General of Immigration 
(DGME, 2011 and 2012). Bonilla-Carrion (2008) shows that Nicaraguans in 
Costa Rica homes do make greater use of social services, but also invest more 
in services that Costa Rican households. 
However, the same CCSS provides confuse data. In 2011, Castillo based 
on the 2003 study, but with renewed data, shows how between 1997 and 2011 
the average cost of medical consultations and hospitalization of the foreign 
population increased by 473% and 1,052%, respectively. However, there are 
two shortcomings of this analysis making interpretation extremely problematic. 
First, the data are not corrected for inflation, which would imply a much 
smaller increase of 50% and 200%, respectively. Second, it does not compare 
cost increases of foreign born population with those of the national 
population, and therefore the data do not provide any useful information on 
the immigrant population specifically. 
Despite these shortcomings, this type of analysis and the alarming data 
presented is noteworthy, and may help explain misconceptions on the role of 
service provision to immigrants as a causal factor of the current financial crisis 
of the CCSS. These misconceptions fuel perceptions of illegitimacy and may 
hinder immigrants’ access to healthcare. 
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4  “Shifting in” migration control: reform and law 
enforcement 
4.1 Migration Law Reform 
In July 2009, the Ley General de Migración y Extranjería (Nº 8764) was approved 
by the Legislative Assembly and entered into force in March 2010. This Law 
introduces a number of changes compared to the previous one of 2005 (Kron, 
2011; Lopez, 2012; Sandoval, in press). On a positive note, the ‘security’ 
vocabulary is replaced by ‘human rights’ vocabulary, with many references to 
the international conventions signed by Costa Rica, in majority normative 
frameworks on the welfare of international immigrants promoted by agencies 
of the United Nations and other institutions such as the Organization of 
American States (OAS).3 
Where the previous laws were characterized by their emphasis on public 
safety issues, the 2009 Law incorporates for the first time the concept of 
integration, and the inclusion of human rights and social development topics 
(López, 2012). Kron (2011) argues that, in this sense, it presents a completely 
new and refreshing legal and institutional structure, inscribed in a regional 
paradigm of migration control dominated by the nexus between migration and 
security. Indeed, DGME officials comment with a certain pride that, where 
most migration laws focus on migration control, “understood as migration 
control in its maximum expression of police repression at different levels. […] 
This law, besides immigration control justified by national security, by order, 
stability, […] also proposes that the country's institutions must worry about 
how foreigners live and how they are integrated, inserted into the social 
dynamics” (Interview Julio Aragón, Head of the Integration Direction, 
DGME). 
However, the Law deserves a more critical assessment, as it establishes a 
series of requisites for different migratory statuses, before the DGME, the 
institution that authorizes, rejects and oversees legal entry, stay and departure 
of foreigners. Of special interest for this article is the interaction of migration 
policy with the CCSS the Law establishes.  
In particular, the Law determines that the affiliation to the country’s 
national social security system, the CCSS, is a new requisite for obtaining a 
regular migratory status. Indeed, to start the regularization process, an 
immigrant must be able to show its affiliation to the CCSS for the period he or 
she has been in the country. Specifically, the Law states that “all processing of 
migratory management must guarantee the immigrant’s social security 
                                                 
3 Costa Rica has ratified only one instrument, the ILO Convention 111 on the 
Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation. The country has not 
signed: 1) the C97 ILO Convention concerning Migration for Employment, of 1949; 
2) the C 143 ILO Convention concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the 
Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers, both of 
1975; and 3) the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of Their Families, of 1990 (Bolaños, 2009). 
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insurance. Such guarantee will ensure that each migratory procedure must 
contemplate, as one of the basic requirements, having one of the social 
insurances the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social has to offer” (Law 8764, Article 
7 - paragraph 7. Own translation and italics). 
This requirement by itself is somewhat problematic as it puts the burden 
and final responsibility of insurance on the individual immigrant worker. 
However, given that an important share of Nicaraguan immigrants finds work 
in the informal sector, the criteria seems especially tough in a context where 
the CCSS covers only six in ten economically active persons (Sandoval, in 
press. Based on data from the CCSS). That is, the Law demands all immigrants 
to be insured where a significant proportion of the national population is not 
covered by a direct insurance. In fact, based on 2011 national census data, 27% 
of Nicaraguan immigrants captured by the census was insured directly as a 
salaried worker, compared to only 22.3% of the Costa Rican population, which 
has a much higher rate of indirect insurance (41.4% versus 22.8%), through an 
insured family member (INEC, 2011).  
This resolution can be interpreted as an institutional-mercantile filter to 
diminish the unwanted (albeit necessary) irregular immigration. Without a 
formal employment contract, the only way of affiliation to the CCSS’s 
insurance, requisite for a regular migratory status, is through a voluntary 
payment. This payment, however, implies a cost of between US$ 35 and 60 a 
month depending on the sector of employment, which represents between 9 
and 15% of a person’s salary. If one compares the minimum salary of a 
domestic worker of US$ 287 (IIS et al., 2012), and given the fact that many do 
not even earn this (Martínez, Mora y Voorend, 2009), it becomes clear that the 
insurance means a significant investment for low-skilled informal Nicaraguan 
workers.  
At the same time, the Law establishes a series of payments involved with a 
prolonged regular stay in Costa Rica. According to a press conference 
organized by several civil society organizations, the costs of obtaining a 
residence permit would be as high as US$ 373, and if all costs of the necessary 
documents and travel costs in both countries would be added, this number 
could climb up to US$ 800 (IIS et al., 2012). Additionally, the Law establishes 
significant economic fines if the documents are not renewed in time. Again, 
taking into account the minimum wage, regularization becomes a very difficult 
task for many.  
Finally, the Law also gives the Migration Police more authority and 
autonomy, and allows repressive measures, such as long detentions. This seems 
somewhat contradictory to the human rights vocabulary mentioned earlier. 
Recently, an appeal on the grounds of unconstitutionality was rejected by the 
Sala Constitucional (Exp: 11-011315-0007-CO, Res. No. 2012005251, 25 April 
2012) the highest independent body that must ensure the constitutionality of 
all laws and acts, stating that preventive arrest for 24 hours is warranted to 
verify immigration status without a hint of offense, and this period can be 
extended on the condition of a justified reason controlled by other bodies.   
All in all, making up a balance of the Migration Law of 2009, following 
Sandoval (forthcoming: 7), the new conditions do not stimulate the process of 
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regularization, and the Law “produces the ‘illegality’ that it itself aims to 
eradicate. That is, the requisites are such that they foster the absence of 
documentation”.  
4.2 Social insurance: Catch-22 
Having social insurance as a requisite for the regularization process, the Law 
creates an important barrier to a regular migratory status for a significant part 
of the Nicaraguan immigrant population. Notably, the CCSS is given a direct 
and explicit role in Costa Rica’s migratory policy. The situation, however, 
becomes more problematic for immigrants. In a series of internal 
communications within the CCSS – of April 10; June 21, October 19 of 2012; 
and February 18 of 2013 – the CCSS creates a new requirement to obtain 
insurance, and reinforces existing requirements to access the institution’s 
health services.  
In the first communication, of 10 April  2012, the CCSS informs its 
employees about “an addition to the guidelines for securing migrants as 
voluntarily insured and self-employed, in accordance with the Law No. 8764, 
the Immigration Law” (CCSS , 2012a: 1. Own translation). When the CCSS’s 
direction, in an official letter that circulated the institution dated 21 February 
2012, established a series of guidelines for obtaining insurance, on March 9, the 
DGME issued a request which made it “necessary to implement an addition to 
the mentioned guidelines”.  
Specifically, the new requisite states that “foreigners who apply for 
insurance for purposes of renovating their residence permit, must present their 
valid residence permit”, or have to be able to show that all the paperwork for 
obtaining a regular migratory status are accepted and in process, in which case 
the CCSS can issue a temporary insurance of up to two months (CCSS, 2012a). 
In the internal memo of the CCSS (2012c: 2) of 19 October 19 2012, this 
requirement is confirmed, establishing a transitory measure “for insuring 
foreigners as voluntarily insured and independent self-employed: […] in 
exceptional cases, for the person with an expired residence permit, the [CCSS] 
will proceed with the insurance, provided that the applicant demonstrates 
presenting official documentation issued by the [DGME], or entities this 
institution authorizes, that the expired residence permit is in process of 
renewal”. 
For this analysis, there are two important implications. The first is that the 
DGME transfers part of migration control responsibilities to the CCSS, which 
is given an explicit role in migration policy, following an official request of the 
DGME. In line with Guiraudon and Lahav (2000) and Morris (2002), this 
transfer of migration control responsibilities represents a shift of migration 
control, inwards to other state institutions, that allows the Costa Rican state to 
maintain control over its migration policy. The second is that the combination 
of migration and social policy creates a Catch 22 situation from which the 
irregular immigrant can hardly escape. The CCSS establishes a regular 
migratory status as a requisite for insurance, while the DGME demands 
insurance to obtain such a status.  
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In interviews, DGME officials told us that the institution created some 
temporary measures to help immigrants escape this Catch-22 situation, for 
example by granting temporary grace periods in which residence permit 
applications were accepted conditioned on the ensuing insurance from the 
CCSS, which allowed them to present to the CCSS the necessary paperwork in 
process (Interview. Adrián Jiménez, DGME). However, they also recognized 
that these measures did not cover the whole population. As Julio Aragón 
(Interview. DGME) put it, “of the three hundred something thousand we 
expected more or less, no more than eighty thousand people approached us”. 
For these people, despite these measures, without either insurance or a 
residence/working permit, it becomes extremely difficult to obtain the other, 
thereby hindering the regularization process and access to healthcare services. 
This Catch 22 situation that results from the interaction of migration and 
social policy limits immigrants’ access to healthcare services and can be 
interpreted as an attempt to discourage irregular migration, which according to 
the official discourse is unwanted. A DGME official put it this way: “We have 
to establish limits for the type of people we want coming over because 
although it sounds ugly, Costa Rica cannot become an importer of poverty. We 
also have to get out of the economic and social problems the country faces, 
and we cannot import a series of exogenous factors that make this situation 
more critical” (Interview. Adrián Jiménez, DGME). Thus, creating limits is 
seen as a way to construct boundaries around scarce resources for social 
investment, which are to be reserved for the national Costa Rican population. 
This way, the State tries to minimize the demand for healthcare services, 
perceived as illegitimate, of the irregular immigrant population (López, 2012). 
4.3 Law enforcement in the CCSS 
In another internal communication from the CCSS (2012b: 2), of 21 June 2012, 
the institution’s officials were reminded that “in case of patients attended in 
state of urgency or emergency, one should proceed in compliance with the 
established procedures and protocols. After finalizing medical attention, the 
Medical Records Service clerk or the emergency services receptionist, 
depending on the case – uncharged with the verification of the patients 
information and the pre-seal of the respective documentation -, will refer the 
patient to the Unit of Validation and Billing of Medical Services, where the 
corresponding bill will be prepared”. 
At the same time, for “all medical care required by UNINSURED patients 
not classified as urgent or an emergency, the applicant must cancel the costs of 
the basic medical consult (in accordance with the effective tariff model), prior 
to the realization of the service” (CCSS, 2012b: 2. Own translation. Capitals in 
original). Although this policy was already in place (López, 2012; Interviews 
with CCSS officials), up until 2011 it was not strictly applied, largely because 
the CCSS’s financial situation allowed for more lenient management (Carrillo 
et al., 2012). Indeed, the Head of the Inspection Area of the CCSS explained 
that until 2011, the institution was not so concerned with this policy, but that 
now the CCSS has become much more careful, become more aggressive” 
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(Interview. Head of Inspection Area, CCSS). Where before irregularities 
“always happened, what happens now is that they are better controlled because 
of the Migration Law” (Interview. Head of Research Sub-Area, CCSS). The 
Director of CCSS’s Inspection, confirmed that the CCSS “has become stricter” 
and that “this is because of an issue of responsibility” (Interview. Director of 
Inspection, CCSS).  
Effectively, in the context of the CCSS’s financial crisis and the Migration 
Law reform, this law enforcement has made it practically impossible to receive 
free medical attention without the CCSS insurance card as a requisite for 
medical care. With regard to this point, in the same internal communication, 
the CCSS refers to the “duty of every official at the moment of attending the 
serving different users of healthcare services provided by the institution, to 
VERIFY meticulously the insurance status of each and every one of them” 
(CCSS , 2012b: 3. Capitals bold and underline in original).  
This law enforcement of existing policies within the CCSS, aims to 
diminish ‘illegitimate’ demand for healthcare services of irregular immigrants. 
Where before immigrant population with irregular migratory status was 
excluded from non-emergency healthcare services, legally it is impossible to 
deny any person emergency care, but with the enforcement of this policy, a 
market-based filter is put in place to limit certain minority groups’ demand for 
these services. At the very least, it serves as a measure to deter people from 
approaching health clinics, unless it is a matter of life and death, because it 
would translate into a significant bill, although the CCSS is still in process of 
defining what happens if the person cannot pay the bill (Interview. Eduardo 
Flores, Head of State Coverage, CCSS). 
This measure not only affects irregular immigrants, but also nationals 
without insurance, whose long term access to medical emergency services 
might depend more on purchasing power, when medical attention is granted, 
but could imply a significant debt. With this, the principle of universalism 
Costa Rica’s social policy regime is famed for is under strain. 
4.4 Looming limits to universalism? 
However, universalism is under even more serious threat. In a directive sent 
out by the head of the CCSS’s State Coverage Area, Eduardo Flores Castro, on 
31 October 2012, medical attention to pregnant women is being questioned. 
Until now, Costa Rica’s social policy regime was truly universal for some 
special groups “whose membership in the social security realm is not based on 
the affiliation with any kind of public insurance” (López, 2012: 127). The State 
universally recognizes their right to healthcare. These groups are children and 
adolescents, pregnant women, abused women, and people carrying infectious 
diseases. The first two groups are protected under the Costa Rican Childhood 
and Adolescence Code, and the Adolescent Mothers Protection Law, 
recognizing children’s and unborn new lives’ universal rights (López, 2012).  
As Eduardo Flores himself put it, “pregnant women are better protected than 
the Central Bank” (Interview. Eduardo Flores, CCSS).  
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However, in reply to a query from Ana Iris Tovar Peña, Head of the 
Financial Accounting Sub-Area of the CCSS, Flores explains that in 
conformity with the Childhood and Adolescence Code there are several 
categories of pregnant women with different social rights, that “seem similar at 
first sight, but really are different” (CCSS, 2012d: 1. Own translation). First, the 
communication explains that foreign pregnant women with official 
identification will be granted pre-natal care if she holds a temporal or residence 
permit emitted by the DGME. Second, if the pregnant woman has a legal 
migratory status, but not as resident (tourist, temporal stay, in transit), “she will 
not be allowed to access health services offered by the [CCSS], except in 
conditions of urgency or emergency”. Third, if the woman has identification 
and lives in the country, but with an irregular migratory status (with a valid 
passport but an expired tourist visa), “Law 7739 will be applied as protection 
to the infant granting a 000 insurance”, which is a special category that covers 
uninsured under certain laws or special norms, “for the period of 
breastfeeding”. Finally, foreign pregnant women with no or expired 
identification, “can only access the services offered by the CCSS in case of 
urgency or emergency”.  
Other high ranking officials were aware of this measure, but were hesitant 
to speak about it, since they believed the measure was “not yet in effect until 
the Legal Department emits a criterion” (Ana Patricia Salas, Director of 
Healthcare Service Comptroller, CCSS). However, On 2 April 2013, the Area 
of Technical Management and Legal Assistance, of the CCSS’ Legal 
Department, pronounces a criteria with respect to these measures about the 
attention to foreign pregnant women without identification, in which it 
recognizes the CCSS’s autonomy to establish and adhere to the criteria that 
apply to both nationals as legal residents. It states that the Childhood and 
Adolescence Code, and the Adolescent Mothers Protection Law “apply to 
those who are legally in the country, with the exception of cases of urgency” 
(CCSS, 2013a: 6. Own translation), thereby allowing the CCSS to establish that 
“undocumented or illegal pregnant women can only receive services in case of 
urgency, as established in article 61 of the Health Insurance regulation. In all 
other cases, if the CCSS is in the capacity to provide the service, it will be able 
to do so on the condition that it charges for these services” (idem).  
López (2012) questions Costa Rican social policy’s ‘universalism’, arguing 
it refers to the historical ability of the State to reach exceptionally high 
coverage, designed for national citizens, but not necessarily to social rights for 
all its legal residents. In his analysis, universalism understood as an inalienable 
right for all within the national territory, rather than ‘universalism’ as high 
coverage, only applies to the mentioned groups, specifically children and 
pregnant women. However, the above analysis shows that these inalienable and 
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undeniable rights for pregnant women, are being questioned as we speak4.  
Thankfully, following a request from the Ombudsman to explain this 
intended measure and pressure from civil society, the CCSS withdrew its 
intentions with a communication dated 10 May 2013, in which it annulled the 
previous directive (CCSS, 2013b). In the communication, precisely the 
Childhood and Adolescence Code is forwarded to ensure “access to healthcare 
services to pregnant women […], regardless of their social security or 
immigration status” (CCSS, 2013b: 1). 
The intention and the fact that the directive had passed the CCSS’s Legal 
Department, however, are reason for concern and emblematic for the 
perceived ‘illegitimacy’ of immigrant healthcare demand which is common 
amongst social service providers. These form serious threats to the principle of 
universalism Costa Rica’s social policy regime is famed for.  
5  Final reflections: internal migration control, sovereignty 
and social citizenship 
As a response to multiple crises, but in particular of the CCSS, the emblematic 
institution of Costa Rica’s ‘exceptional’ solidary and universal social policy 
regime (Martínez Franzoni and Sanchez-Ancochea, 2013), State policy has 
taken measures to make more difficult immigrant’s access to health services. It 
has done so following voices of ‘welfare chauvinism’ based on perceptions 
among Costa Ricans that Nicaraguan immigration is in part to blame for the 
social institution’s financial difficulties, and (unfounded) arguments of Costa 
Rica being a welfare magnet in the region. 
On the one hand, while on paper public policy focuses more explicitly on 
deterring irregular migration, the social construction of the immigrant subject 
as a threat to social security, as ‘illegal’, irrespective of that person’s migratory 
status, implies that healthcare demands are considered illegitimate under the 
national population, and even under CCSS officials, which in some cases 
results in unjustified denial of access to social services (López, 2012; 
Interviews).  
On the other hand, the interplay between migration and social policy to 
create a Catch-22 situation in which social insurance is a requisite for 
regularization and vice versa, creates a serious barrier for immigrants’ access to 
healthcare. Where migration authorities stipulate that healthcare insurance is an 
                                                 
4 In the interview with Eduardo Flores, I was handed the internal communication 
mentioned in the text. After asking and getting permission to circulate the document, 
I sent it to Karina Fonseca, of the Servicio Jesuita para Migrantes, and Carlos 
Sandoval, researcher at the Institute for Social Research, who immediately asked for 
an appointment with the Costa Rican Ombudsperson’s Office, with whom they 
discussed the possibility of an appeal for infringement of fundamental rights and 
freedoms (Recurso de Amparo). After a request from the Ombudsman to the CCSS, 
the latter withdrew the directive. 
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indispensable requisite to start the regularization process, the CCSS demands a 
regular migratory status as a requisite for insurance.  
The role the CCSS has been granted in the country’s migration policy is 
remarkable. As the most important healthcare insurance and provision 
institution, it has explicitly been incorporated by the DGME, with the 2009 
reform to the Migration Law, as one of the pillars of migration policy and a key 
element of internal migration control. This reflects a shift in Costa Rica’s 
migration policy, which until 2010 was almost exclusively based on border 
control, (Borge, 2004; Morales, 2008; Jiménez, 2009; López, 2012), to include 
healthcare access as an internal control measure.  
This way, the Costa Rican State has “shifted in” migration control, as the 
measures represent an explicit movement towards internal migration control 
(Morissens, 2008, Morris, 2002; Bommes and Geddes, 2000). Although the 
2009 Migration Law in vocabulary adheres to human rights discourse, far from 
conceding state power and sovereignty as ‘globalists’ would have it (Soysal, 
1994; Jacobsen, 1996, Sassen, 1996, 1998; Sharma, 2006), the State has indeed 
found ways to circumvent international normative constraints, shifting the 
level at which control measures are elaborated and implemented. This kind of 
State policy reaction “shows the adaptiveness of agencies within the central 
state apparatus in charge of migration control and their political allies” 
(Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000: 165). In sum, the State and its policies have not 
lost central importance in determining the requirements for access to 
citizenship, national welfare benefits, and thereby the conditions under which 
migration occurs. 
In times of economic and political crises, it is a fairly common policy 
reaction to limit access to social welfare benefits (Morrisens, 2008; Ryner, 
2000; Bommes and Geddes, 2000; Hujo and Piper, 2010; Banting, 2000; 
Baldwin-Edwards, 2002), especially in contexts where pressures to liberalize, 
deregulate and diminish State presence. Ryner (2000: 52) asks whether we are 
witnessing the move from a Keynesian welfare state to a ‘neoliberal welfare 
state’. In a reflection highly relevant for present-day Costa Rica, the author 
questions the concept of social citizenship: 
The neo-liberal paradigm shift that has been evident since the early 1980s has 
subsequently redressed the systemic crisis of capitalism, but the consequence has 
been a serious attenuation of social citizenship that, within the present trajectory, 
may well continue. If so, then it is doubtful whether it is meaningful to talk about 
social citizenship at all in relation to social welfare provision. Social services and 
insurance that previously were delivered and managed according to the norms of 
universal public entitlement, are increasingly privatised and/or managed 
according to business criteria for those with adequate purchasing power on the 
market. […] In this context a welfare state may still exist, but it is doubtful that 
social citizenship does. 
In any case, the principle of universalism does not necessarily apply to 
immigrants, even if these immigrants have a regular migratory status (López, 
2012). Especially worrisome is the recent initiative to deny undocumented 
immigrant pregnant women in Costa Rican territory access to prenatal care, as 
it would have come to question one of two groups, children and pregnant 
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women, who enjoy ‘true’ universalism, based on the inalienable right to such 
services. Indeed, welfare chauvinism seems to translate into more restrictive 
requirements for social policy eligibility, in attempts to prevent ‘illegitimate’ 
demands for access to social programs. Social and migration policy conspire to 
discourage (irregular) migration, constructing and mobilizing “boundaries 
around issues of distribution of welfare state resources” (Faist, 1994: 440). 
With measures that do not stimulate the process of regularization (Sandoval, 
forthcoming) and by limiting access to social policy, Costa Rica’s current 
migration policy seems to welcome certain groups of immigrants (highly 
qualified workers and pensioners from the U.S.) that bring knowledge and 
capital to the country, but does not welcome low-skilled workers from 
Nicaragua and other countries. This latter population is perceived as unwanted, 
because they are considered ‘illegal’ (even if they have their paperwork in 
order), and at least according to official and popular discourse, as a threat to 
social security and difficult to integrate (Sandoval, 2008; cf. Hujo y Piper, 2010: 
9-10). However, their undeniable importance as cheap and highly exploitable 
labor force for key sectors of Costa Rica’s economy depends exactly on their 
‘clandestine’ state. Once again, following Banting (2000), in Costa Rica the true 
challenge to social inclusion also comes from majorities, no minorities. 
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